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The Unjustified Furor Over
Securities Arbitration
Gilbert R. Serota*
When the United States Supreme Court decided Shearson v. Mc-
Mahon,' it closed the largest loophole preventing full enforcement of
arbitration clauses in contracts between securities brokers and their
customers. The decision made it clear that artful pleading of federal
securities laws claims could not preclude enforcement of an arbitra-
tion agreement. The resulting outcry was immediate and loud. The
plaintiff bar, consumer groups, columnists, state legislators and even
members of Congress began to clamor for relief from mandatory,
pre-dispute arbitration agreements-a movement that, while some-
what abated, continues today. This article examines whether the fu-
ror created by McMahon is justified.
I. SHEARSON V. MCMAHON
When viewed in ligat of prior Supreme Court decisions, the McMa-
hon case was neither a radical change in the Court's direction nor
philosophy. Rather, it was another logical step in the Court's recog-
nition and strong endorsement of private alternatives to judicial dis-
pute resolution.
Its predecessors foreshadowed McMahon. In 1983, in Moses H.
Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.,2 the
Supreme Court held that the district court erred in staying a federal
* A.B., Princeton University, 1973; J.D., Columbia Law School, 1976; partner,
Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe. The author of this article has represented both plain-
tiffs and defendants in numerous securities-related arbitrations under the rules of both
the New York Stock Exchange and the National Association of Securities Dealers, and
is a strong proponent of arbitration. He is a member of the California State Senate
Commission on Corporate Governance, Shareholder Rights and Securities Transaction
and served as co-chair of its subcommittee on Securities Arbitration. This article is
adapted from a presentation he made at the 1988 Annual Conference of the Society of
Professionals in Dispute Resolution.
1. 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987).
2. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
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action to enforce an arbitration agreement and deferring to a parallel
state case. It declared that federal policy favors arbitration and that
Congress's clear intent is "to move the parties to an arbitrable dis-
pute out of court and into arbitration as quickly and easily as
possible."3
A year later, in Southland Corp. v. Keating,4 the Court found that
the California Franchise Investment Law,5 interpreted by the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court as invalidating franchisee-franchisor arbitra-
tion agreements, was preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA).6 Again, the Court justified its holding on the basis of a
strong national policy favoring arbitration.
In 1985, in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Qhrysler-Plymouth,7
the Court considered whether federal statutes providing a judicial
remedy in automobile dealership disputes implicitly precluded arbi-
tration under agreements between the automaker and dealer. It held
that, in view of the "emphatic federal policy in favor of arbitral dis-
pute resolution,"8 statutory claims within the scope of an arbitration
contract are presumed arbitrable unless Congress's explicit intent to
exclude such claims is "deducible from text or legislative history" of
the act in question.9
In Dean Witter Reynolds v. Byrd,'o the Court held that state law
claims pendent to a federal rule 10b-511 claim were arbitrable even in
the face of the inefficiency of dual proceedings. For the purposes of
its decision, the Court presumed that rule 10b-5 claims were not arbi-
trable, thus leaving unanswered the issues later raised by McMahon.
In 1987, the stage was fully set for McMahon. The Court, in Perry
v. Thomas,12 held that provisions of the California Labor Code invali-
dating agreements to arbitrate wage collection actions were pre-
empted by the FAA. It held that Congress's enactment of the
Federal Arbitration Agreement was clearly intended to "provide for
the enforcement of arbitration agreements within the full reach of
the Commerce Clause."13
In McMahon, the Court answered what was left unaddressed in
Byrd. It held that claims under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
3. Id. at 22.
4. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
5. See CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 31000-31516 (West 1977 & Supp. 1989).
6. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
7. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
8. Id. at 631.
9. Id. at 628.
10. 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
11. 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (1988).
12. 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
13. Id. at 490.
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(the 1934 Act)14 were arbitrable, rejecting the reasoning of Wilko v.
Swan,15 which precluded arbitration of claims under the Securities
Act of 1933 (the 1933 Act).16 Thus, McMahon made it clear that
characterizing a broker-customer dispute as a federal claim under the
1934 Act, specifically rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, would not
be condoned as a way to avoid mandatory arbitration.
In light of prior history, it is difficult to argue that McMahon was
unprecedented or unexpected. Its timing, however, was significant.
Only a little more than four months after the McMahon decision was
issued came the crash of October 19, 1987. That market debacle, in
which the Dow Jones Industrial Average plunged over 500 points in a
single day and 1000 points in less than a week, created hundreds of
potential plaintiffs. McMahon, however, left many of them (and
their attorneys) without recourse to the courts. This combination of
events focused unprecedented attention on the procedures of securi-
ties arbitration.
II. THE DEBATE OVER ARBITRATION OF SECURITIES DISPUTES
If the hearings held by the California Senate Commission on Cor-
porate Governance, Shareholder Rights and Securities Transactions
in 1988 are indicative, members of the public who oppose arbitration
have little actual experience to support their case. Indeed, every
nonlawyer who testified against securities arbitration had a common
characteristic-never having arbitrated a claim. If they had done so,
either under the rules of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or
the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), they would
likely have found that the process offers significant benefits over
traditional judicial dispute resolution. These can be briefly summa-
rized as follows:
1. Efficiency: Arbitrations are scheduled more regularly than
court trials; pre-trial discovery is significantly limited, and proceed-
ings are usually shorter and less costly than court or jury trials. This
means that the costs-both to the litigants and the public-are appre-
ciably reduced.
2. Informality: Arbitrators are not bound by the traditional rules
of evidence.17 This results in fewer evidentiary hearings or argu-
14. 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
15. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
16. 15 U.S.C. § 77(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
17. See, e.g., NASD, CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE § 34 (1988) ("The arbitra-
tors... shall not be bound by rules governing the admissibility of evidence.").
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ment, and the receipt of more testimony from fewer witnesses.
3. Finality: Arbitration awards can only be challenged on the
most extreme grounds,18 such as fraud or clear misconduct by the ar-
bitrators. The result is that the uncertainty, delay, and expense of
the appellate process is virtually eliminated in arbitration.
4. Fairness: No critic of arbitration has shown by statistics or
otherwise that arbitrations are unfair to claimants. Express rules re-
quire that arbitrators be neutral and provide litigants with both per-
emptory challenges and challenges for cause. Testimony before the
California Senate Commission by representatives of Charles Schwab
& Co. and Dean Witter Reynolds suggested strongly that securities
arbitration results in frequent awards to claimants.
III. PERCEIVED PROBLEMS
The critics of securities arbitration do, nonetheless, raise some sig-
nificant issues. As discussed below, however, while worthy of close
consideration, and possibly reform, these issues plainly do not justify
abandonment of the system of mandatory arbitration.
A. Bias of Arbitrators
Without putting forward concrete evidence of any kind, the critics
contend that securities arbitration panels are biased in favor of the
brokerage houses. The rules require that arbitration panels in cus-
tomer disputes be composed of a majority of members from outside
the industry and provide for challenges. However, until recent re-
forms, retired securities professionals and attorneys regularly repre-
senting securities firms were considered "outside" panel members.
Such practices have now been eliminated by adoption of more rigor-
ous standards.' 9 The critics still contend that the panels from which
arbitrators are selected for a particular case are unduly business-ori-
ented and that a business and/or professional background of the arbi-
trators is unfair to lay customers. That has yet to be proven.
Indeed, there are persuasive counter-arguments. The business
background of the arbitrators significantly reduces the time and ex-
pense of explaining the securities markets, complex transactions, and
the internal procedures of large institutions. This expertise works to
the advantage of both parties. More importantly, both experienced
practitioners and arbitrators contend that securities arbitrators tend
to view themselves as representatives of the regulatory authority
sponsoring the panel. They see themselves charged with a duty to
18. See, e.g., Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 2, 10, 11 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986);
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1286.2 (West 1982).
19. See 48 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 20, at 1847 (Dec. 9, 1987).
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the public and profession of maintaining confidence in the integrity
of the securities marketplace. They tend not to tolerate unfair or
questionable practices.
There is little or no hard data available to refute either argument.
It seems clear, however, that it would be a serious mistake automati-
cally to equate the expertise and experience of arbitrators with bias.
That unjustified conclusion would undermine one of the primary
benefits of arbitration.
B. Discovery Limitations
Many critics of securities arbitration also focus on the very limited
discovery available to the parties. Few litigators, however, would dis-
agree with the characterization of judicial discovery as a two-edged
sword. The costs are probably higher than any other pre-trial matter
and the potential for harassment and delay is significant. Arbitration
seeks to avoid these costs.
It does not, however, eliminate discovery. In both NYSE and
NASD arbitrations, "the parties are encouraged to cooperate in the
voluntary exchange of such documents and information as will serve
to expedite the arbitration."20 Where resistance is encountered, the
arbitrators have power to order production of records from any mem-
ber, firm or person.21 There are no provisions for pre-hearing deposi-
tions or interrogatories. As to third party discovery, the arbitrators
have full subpoena power available "by applicable law."22
Rarely do parties to an arbitration object to the absence of deposi-
tions or interrogatories. The most often heard complaint is that the
securities firm has not produced significant documents or did so too
late to permit full analysis of the materials by the customer's counsel.
Such circumstances no doubt occur (as they do in judicial proceed-
ings), although most arbitration cases seem to proceed without signif-
icant discovery disputes.
If problems concerning document production arise, they are reme-
diable under existing rules. First, arbitrators almost always order the
production of materials requested by a plaintiff when a good faith ar-
gument is made. If the order comes too late, a request for a delay in
proceeding with the case can accompany the demand.23
20. NASD, CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE § 32(b) (1988).
21. Id. § 33.
22. Id. § 32(a).
23. Id. § 30.
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Because of its expense, many contend that it would seriously un-
dermine the benefits of arbitration if the judicial sort of document
discovery were to be permitted. There may, however, be room to as-
sure that pre-hearing document exchanges are meaningful without
being unduly burdensome. The arbitration rules could be amended
to specify that a customer has a right to certain specific materials,
such as new account records, account statements, order tickets, and
the like. Each party should also have a right to see their adversary's
expert reports or workpapers in advance of any such testimony. An-
other way that this could be handled would be by way of a pre-hear-
ing conference held with the chair of the arbitration panel or with an
arbitration counsel supplied by the arbitration sponsor, each of whom
would be empowered to make such rulings.
Although discovery problems obviously arise in arbitration, as they
do in any litigation, such problems appear solvable within the ex-
isting framework or through moderate reforms. They do not appear,
however, to undermine the ultimate benefits of securities arbitration.
C Records and Reasons for Rulings
Arbitration panels presently are not required to state reasons for
an award or make any findings of fact or rulings on legal matters.
This procedure is considered by many to be an integral part of the
efficiency and informality of arbitration because it permits a fast and
efficient ruling by persons who are not lawyers or judges and need
not be put to the test of couching their decision in legal terms. Un-
fortunately, the absence of explanation often results in a good deal of
confusion and lack of satisfaction among the parties to the arbitra-
tion. As to customers, the absence of support or explanation for an
award-particularly an award of less than they have requested-
clearly tends to undermine their confidence in the fairness of the
procedures.
The question of what to do about this issue is difficult, with no easy
solution. Proponents of disclosure point not only to the absence of
confidence engendered by the present system, but seek records of
awards to use as "precedent" in later proceedings. Opponents of dis-
closure of more than the award itself, suggest that requiring any kind
of findings or conclusions by the arbitration panel will have at least
three undesirable effects: (1) increasing the burdens of arbitration
counsel supplied by the regulatory sponsor or by counsel for the par-
ties, who inevitably will have to write and propose such statements;
(2) increasing the burdens on the arbitrators to express legal views
and make evidentiary conclusions thereby discouraging some, partic-
ularly nonlawyer arbitrators, from serving; and (3) increasing the op-
portunity for judicial challenges to arbitration rulings.
silo
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Both NYSE and NASD have proposed to the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) that more information about awards be
disclosed. The NASD has proposed making the amount of awards
public, thereby providing some precedent, although protecting the ar-
bitrators' names from disclosure. 24 The NYSE has proposed the use
of an "award statement," which would include a summary of the dis-
pute, description of the relief awarded, and a summary of other is-
sues resolved.2 5 Significantly, neither body has proposed that an
explanation of the result or conclusion on the merits be prepared.
Given the importance of maintaining public confidence in arbitra-
tion, it would seem prudent to experiment with an appropriately
qualified summary of the primary reasons for the award. The award
preamble could state, for example, that the enclosed statement is
made not to express legal conclusions or findings of fact, but only to
express the general, lay view of the arbitrators concerning the dis-
pute and is not intended to be used in any other proceeding.
While such a procedure raises the spectre of increased appeals and/
or collateral proceedings in court, the limited grounds for appeal
under the FAA and its state law counterparts26 is likely to prohibit a
significant increase in attempts to vacate the award even if some ex-
planations are included. Thus, the risk of increased appellate pro-
ceedings may not be a real risk. If the procedure does result in
problems, it can be eliminated or revised.
IV. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
In the face of organized lobbying, state legislators, unable to re-
form the procedural rules of NASD or NYSE, have focused on the
"voluntariness" of arbitration. Bills or administrative rules to outlaw
pre-dispute arbitration agreements have been proposed in several
states. Legislators and other bill proponents note that, not unlike
other arbitration agreements, securities arbitration agreements are
often signed by customers at the time they open certain types of ac-
counts at a brokerage house. The theory behind proposed legislation
appears to be that claimants and their counsel should be permitted to
choose between litigation and arbitration after a dispute arises rather
than at the inception of a relationship with their broker. Such pro-
posals would, if adopted, undermine the system of arbitration by
24. See supra note 19.
25. Id.
26. See supra note 18.
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making it subject to the whims of either side during the heat of a
dispute.
Whatever the merits of such reforms, state legislative efforts ap-
pear to be futile. Both the Supreme Court and the lower federal
courts have consistently held that the Federal Arbitration Act pre-
empts state laws that distinguish enforcement or interpretation of ar-
bitration contracts from other contracts. In Massachusetts, the Sec-
retary of State attempted to regulate pre-dispute securities
arbitration agreements by issuing regulations effective January 1,
1989, defining "dishonest or unethical practices in the securities busi-
ness" to include, inter alia, requiring customers to execute pre-dis-
pute mandatory arbitration agreements as a "non-negotiable
precondition" to doing business. The Massachusetts federal district
court, however, in Securities Industry Association v. Michael J. Con-
nolly,27 held that by "establishing hurdles to the formation and exe-
cution of securities agreements that are not found in the general
contract law of Massachusetts," the Massachusetts regulations con-
flict with the Federal Arbitration Act.28
The California Legislature's experience foreshadowed the Massa-
chusetts ruling. During California's consideration of legislation to
either outlaw or limit pre-dispute arbitration, a compromise bill was
introduced to require more stringent disclosures at the time of enter-
ing an arbitration contract. However, the California Legislative
Counsel issued an opinion that such legislation would be pre-
empted.29 California's Senator Dan McCorquodale, who offered the
disclosure legislation, subsequently withdrew his bill upon assurances
that the regulatory authorities had committed to propose to the SEC
adoption of more stringent disclosure requirements for future arbi-
tration agreements.
V. CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
Pre-emption is, of course, no bar to action by Congress. The ques-
tion at the national level therefore becomes not whether the Con-
gress can act, but whether it should act. As explained above, it is by
no means clear that mandatory arbitration should be disfavored. In-
deed, longstanding federal policies on arbitration and industry self-
regulation clearly support it. No evidence offered by critics of the
system appears to justify a return to the option of judicial dispute
resolution in the securities industry.
There is, however, another reason that Congress should defer-the
expertise of the SEC. Congress set up the SEC, in part, to oversee
27. No. 88-2153-WD, slip op. (D. Mass) (Dec. 19, 1988).
28. Id. at 17.
29. Letter to Honorable Dan McCorquodale, April 26, 1988.
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the securities markets and the self-regulatory bodies. The SEC has
functioned adequately and, at times, vigorously, to protect public cus-
tomers and maintain confidence in the public securities markets.
The SEC opposes doing away with mandatory pre-dispute arbitration.
Congress would be ill-served to ignore the SEC's views. Thus, for
both substantive policy reasons and in deference to the SEC, Con-
gress should stay its hand.
VI. CONCLUSION
For over a year now, securities industry disputes have been going
to arbitration in record numbers. While pressure for reform remains
strong, the source does not appear to be those who have been
through the process or studied it extensively. Nor have statistics or
other hard data been offered which justify reexamining the proce-
dures currently in place. In this light, the furor over McMahon
seems unjustified.
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